Suchergebnisse

Aid fragmentation and a lack of donor coordination have been widely recognized as principal problems impairing the effectiveness of aid. In particular, the importance of within-country division of labor has been highlighted in recent years. At the same time, rigorous quantitative analyses of within-country aid coordination are largely missing. Taking the whole donor pool(including NGOs) within an aid recipient country into account, we examine the coordination behavior of donors across regions and sectors. Our results indicate a modest degree of donor coordination within Cambodia, even after the 2005 Paris Declaration. In particular, the coordination efforts among bilateral donors seem rather limited, suggesting that their political and economic interests prevent closer coordination. With respect to the behavior of NGOs, we find them to be mainly active in the same regions and sectors as official donors, creating coordination problems between the two groups of donors. In addition, NGOs appear to cluster in the regional-sectoral space although there seems to be some sort of coordination among them.

Aid fragmentation and a lack of donor coordination have been widely recognized as principal problems impairing the effectiveness of aid. In particular, the importance of within-country division of labor has been highlighted in recent years. At the same time, rigorous quantitative analyses of within-country aid coordination are largely missing. Taking the whole donor pool(including NGOs) within an aid recipient country into account, we examine the coordination behavior of donors across regions and sectors. Our results indicate a modest degree of donor coordination within Cambodia, even after the 2005 Paris Declaration. In particular, the coordination efforts among bilateral donors seem rather limited, suggesting that their political and economic interests prevent closer coordination. With respect to the behavior of NGOs, we find them to be mainly active in the same regions and sectors as official donors, creating coordination problems between the two groups of donors. In addition, NGOs appear to cluster in the regional-sectoral space although there seems to be some sort of coordination among them.

Aid fragmentation and a lack of donor coordination have been widely recognized as principal problems impairing the effectiveness of aid. In particular, the importance of within-country division of labor has been highlighted in recent years. At the same time, rigorous quantitative analyses of within-country aid coordination are largely missing. Taking the whole donor pool(including NGOs) within an aid recipient country into account, we examine the coordination behavior of donors across regions and sectors. Our results indicate a modest degree of donor coordination within Cambodia, even after the 2005 Paris Declaration. In particular, the coordination efforts among bilateral donors seem rather limited, suggesting that their political and economic interests prevent closer coordination. With respect to the behavior of NGOs, we find them to be mainly active in the same regions and sectors as official donors, creating coordination problems between the two groups of donors. In addition, NGOs appear to cluster in the regional-sectoral space although there seems to be some sort of coordination among them.

AbstractAn explicit goal of foreign aid is to promote female empowerment and gender equality in developing countries. We investigate if foreign aid achieves this intended goal by examining its impact on gender performance of recipient countries at the country level. Employing structural equation models, our results suggest that aid alone, even when targeted to directly improve gender outcomes, is unlikely to shift systemic inequalities. Aid will need to bolster civil society efforts that challenge institutional structures and norms in order to impact gender outcomes at country level. © 2020 The Authors. Journal of International Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Although it is widely believed that food aid distorts incentives to increase agricultural production, detailed empirical country studies conducted in recent years suggest that the disincentive effect of food aid has been overemphasized. An analysis of sixteen developing countries that achieved particularly high growth rates in food production of 3.9 percent during 1961-76 shows that they also received about 80 percent more food aid per capita than the average food aid recipient country.1 Six of these countries were receiving an especially high amount of food aid over an extended period. While there is no clear-cut negative or positive relationship between food aid and growth in food production, they are not mutually exclusive. Government policy plays a crucial role in this regard. ; PR ; IFPRI1

AbstractThis research paper seeks to explain why investment‐recipient countries, like Australia and Canada, reject certain investments in strategic industries and shield some domestic business from foreign acquisitions. Existing studies suggest that the decision to restrict FDI is driven by national security concerns, which are often conceptualized as a catch‐all concept. This paper develops a novel theoretical construct – 'FDI acceptability threshold' (a maximum point of political tolerance for any given foreign investment) – to provide a more nuanced understanding of government decisions to reject FDI. This theoretical construct is based on four factors – nature of the domestic firm/industry, nature of the acquirer, external opposition, and domestic backlash. Drawing on two cases of Chinese SOEs' investment in the energy sector in Australia and Canada, this paper demonstrates that investment‐recipient countries are more likely to protect a domestic business where foreign ownership threatens domestic industry by exceeding FDI acceptability thresholds. Given that these thresholds are often not directly identified in the host country's policies, this paper proposes that host countries should clarify these conditions to ensure that they continue to attract FDI.